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The ability of Ethiopian farmers to deal with rainfall risk is scanty due to the extension of land 
plots and incomplete and inefficient financial markets. Traditional drought insurance is flawed by 
information asymmetries, high administrative costs, and non-diversifiable risks. Insurance based 
on indexes is a promising alternative. Working on 120 rural households, we estimate the 
willingness to pay for a drought weather derivative through a mixed logit model allowing for 
random preferences. The results suggest that the premium, indemnity, and perceived frequency of 
drought are important determinants of the take-up. Apparent inconsistencies in behavior can be 
interpreted as rational choices.  
 





ural households and individuals in developing countries are vulnerable to shocks, be they man-made 
or natural disasters. Even other adverse, non-catastrophic conditions may challenge farmers and limit 
their potential to develop and innovate. Rainfall variability is a major problem as agricultural activity 
is almost all rain-fed in remote rural areas. Several traditional strategies are followed by households to deal with this 
vulnerability: reducing exposure, cumulating money buffers, looking for credit, implementing diversification, or 
participating in informal insurance mechanisms. Some of these strategies may not be effective (Fafchamps, 1999). 
For example, informal or self-insurance mechanisms may be limited by the dependence on co-variance of risks and 
may show certain rigidity towards changes (Dercon, 2003). 
 
Formal insurance is often considered a challenge both for farmers and for insurers. Brown (2001) recalls 
that the demand for formal insurance depends at least on the will of customers to reduce their vulnerability, on their 
ability and willingness to pay (WTP), and on the suitability of the contract. On the other side, insurers judge the 
opportunity to offer insurance on the existence of basic implementation conditions. As Brown (2001) states, beside 
the need for large enough numbers of potential customers, for the possibility to estimate price and diversify risk, and 
for efficient delivery channels – often lacking elements in rural areas – the insurance contract should be conceived 
so that the information asymmetries are under control. As in the case of lending, the moral hazard can be reduced in 
cooperative insurance agreements, thanks to peer control (Viganò et al., 2007). Differently from the case of lending, 
however, the limited size of cooperative schemes in a poor rural context may make insurance unfeasible. Formal 
insurance options may then be available if they succeed in proposing insurance contracts that are effective with 
respect to the achievement of their financial sustainability and to the satisfaction of customers’ preference, 
combining the product with a suitable delivery process. However, this is not an easy task.  
 
R 
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Crop insurance has been widely studied and many examples show how difficult it is to offer suitable 
products as failures are often reported in the literature, especially in public projects led more by development goals 
than by sustainability (Viganò, 2002). A frequent distortion of insurance schemes based on estimated crop losses is 
moral hazard, which loosens farmers’ commitment to production (Hess et al., 2002).  
 
Conversely, relatively new products base the compensation on the value taken by properly designed, 
standardized, and verifiable indexes (precipitation, wind speed, temperature, solar radiation), which have a statistical 
correlation with crop yields and cannot be influenced by the customer behavior (Bryla et al., 2003). These contracts 
minimize the ex-post verification costs (Hill & Robles, 2011). The prevailing contracts are based on area yield, 
livestock, weather indexes, or weather derivatives (Hess et al., 2002; Skees, 2003). The first type simplifies by 
assuming that homogeneous areas can be localized and the average yield loss is applied to all farmers of the same 
area, although some adjustments are possible for single farmers (FAO, 1992, 2001; Skees et al., 2002). Similar 
average computing applies to livestock protection. In both cases, payment is due if the area losses exceed a given 
threshold. Weather index insurance is based on the correlation between natural phenomena and agricultural yields 
and foresees compensations if the index exceeds or falls short of (depending on the type of risk) a given threshold. 
Computing the correlation and estimating the payment due for each point gap between the threshold and the actual 
measurement are complex processes, the appropriateness of which depends on the accurate choice of the period of 
observation, the quality of the meteorological data, and data on farmers’ historical production. Specific adjustments 
allow compliance with farming seasons or with other customer characteristics and preferences (Hess, 2003; Skees, 
2003). A similar outcome can be assured by using weather derivatives as, despite the different contractual form, they 
also foresee a payment based on a tick size multiplied by the gap between the index and the actual measurement of 
the weather variable (Hess et al., 2002; Skees, 2003). While Berg et al. (2004) stress that index-based insurance is 
more often used in the case of catastrophic risk exposure, weather derivatives are also increasingly applied to the 
same target. A difference portrayed by Hill and Robles (2011) is related to the greater suitability of weather 
derivatives for different customer preferences than standard index insurance and to their higher liquidity. 
 
These contracts are expected to reduce farmers’ revenue volatility. Hill and Robles (2011) quote examples 
portrayed by Hess and Hazell (2009) and mention implementations in Ethiopia for haricot beans and teff, in India 
for groundnuts and multiple crops, in Malawi for groundnuts and tobacco, in the Philippines for rice, and in Peru for 
cotton. However, despite their potential usefulness, the insurance uptake still seems meagre (Clark & Kalani, 2011; 
Sarris, 2013) and critical points are stressed. They are related to technical matters, such as the higher basis risk to 
which customers are exposed, and to the cost of these contracts.
i
 Besides, the lack of appropriate delivery channels 
or the high delivery cost may impede their development. One major obstacle envisaged in these contracts refers to 
farmers’ willingness to pay the premium and, more generally, to bear the total transaction costs. The attitude, in turn, 
depends on the advantage offered by the insurance. One can reasonably expect that the more the product reflects the 
overall risk exposure, the lesser is the basis risk perceived, and the fewer the alternatives, the higher could be the 
willingness to pay a given price (or to bear a given total purchase cost). Put in the reverse way, the lower is the risk 
exposure; the higher is the basis risk or the competition in supply (formal and informal), the lower the price that the 
farmer wants to pay. Regarding the basis risk, it seems that offering compound index products (Elabed et al., 2013) 
or combining simple weather derivatives so that more than one risk is included (Hill et al., 2011) contributes to 
reducing the impact of the basis risk and to improving the WTP. Another related obstacle mentioned by Sarris 
(2013), quoting Bryan (2010), is the “ambiguity aversion,” which makes it unappealing for customers to buy a 
financial product based on a probability distribution they cannot duly assess. These are just a few examples of the 
influence of several factors on the willingness to buy index-based insurance or a weather derivative. The remaining 
part of the article is organized as follows. The next section explores some outcomes of studies on the determinants 
of the WTP, while section 3 offers a brief overview of experiences and studies in Ethiopia. Sections 4, 5 and 6 
describe the research experiment, the empirical approach, and the employed control variables, respectively. The 
discussion and interpretation of the results are provided by section 7. Section 8 simulates the market shares of 
hypothetical standardized products. Section 9 concludes.      
 
2. WILLINGNESS TO PAY IN THE RECENT LITERATURE 
 
Several studies, especially in recent years, have attempted to gain a better understanding of the factors 
behind the willingness of rural farmers in poor countries to pay for insurance. Differently from a similar exercise run 
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in a country or for a population segment in which insurance is already widespread,  inquiries regarding target 
segments when insurance products seldom exist cannot replicate real situations and are based on hypothetical 
products; the answers obtained do not necessarily represent actual behaviors as households may behave very 
differently in the real world (Breidert et al.,  2006, as quoted by Hill et al., 2011). Nevertheless, WTP studies 
contribute to improving the offer of insurance, help to fine-tune the design and provision of insurance products and 
identify the most suitable markets and the limiting factors perceived by potential customers, and provide an estimate 
of the price elasticity. For a more general plan, the welfare implications of the use of crop insurance can be assessed, 
which may suggest to policy formulators better ways to promote access (Hill et al., 2011; Sarris, Karfakis, & 
Christiaensen, 2006). Several factors affecting WTP are outlined by the different studies, pertaining to the customer 
characteristics or the type of suppliers involved; the studies differ in the emphasis put on such characteristics as well 
as in the analytical approach. Below, the main findings are presented. A necessary caveat relates to the fact that 
these studies differ regarding the type of product considered (index-based policy or weather derivative), which 
makes comparisons less obvious. Another warning refers to the efficacy of the experiments which is challenged in 
some studies when a limited correlation is found between the stated and revealed preferences (McIntosh et al., 
2013), although for Norton et al. (2011, 2012) this is not the case.  
 
Some objective factors affecting WTP are highlighted by Hill and Robles (2011), who find that farmers 
with poorer soil quality buy more insurance. Sakurai and Reardon (1997) stress the dependence of the demand for 
drought insurance on the different agro-climatic zones, which implies different risk exposures (also confirmed by 
Hill & Robles, 2011). The features of different natural hazards are also important factors for the insurance 
participation decision. Patt et al. (2009) point out that most studies focus on economic explanations (such as the size 
and timing of the premium and the potential payouts, utility and risk aversion), while behavioral factors (emotions 
and trust in the suppliers, in the product, or in oneself) may matter more and imply pursuing customer’s satisfaction 
rather than optimization. In fact, the customer’s personal preferences and entrepreneurial characteristics, as in any 
other financial transaction, may play a major role in determining the WTP.  
 
The attitude toward risk is a key factor. Hill et al. (2011) confirm a positive relationship between perceived 
risk exposure and WTP for insurance. Fraser (1992) aims to capture the impact of insurance on the Australian wheat 
producer’s expected income and variance. He finds that WTP is relatively insensitive to price variability but strongly 
positively related to yield variability. The degree of risk aversion may induce the farmer to buy insurance; however, 
the lack of knowledge coupled with risk aversion may induce caution. The effect of risk aversion on WTP may 
actually have the opposite sign, sometimes counter-intuitively as, under specific conditions, in Hill et al. (2011) for 
Ethiopia. Giné et al. (2008), in their study on Andhra Pradesh, India, find that risk-averse households are less likely 
to purchase only if they are unfamiliar with the insurance contract or with the dealer.  
 
Akter et al. (2009) state that the demand for crop insurance varies according to several factors related to 
different risk management strategies: area characteristics, the breadwinner’s occupation, land ownership, and farm 
size. Gautam et al. (1994), in their study in Tamil Nadu (India), apart from risk attitude, empirically test for the joint 
hypothesis of risk avoidance and welfare smoothing, with the aim of studying the latent demand due to inadequate 
risk management strategies. Their results prove that this demand is high with a willingness to pay 13–17% of 
income as the premium. Sakurai and Reardon (1997), who study drought insurance in Burkina Faso, show that the 
demand depends, among other things, on how households manage risk ex ante and ex post: wealthier, more self-
insured farmers demand less formal drought insurance. Negative significant effects of off-farm income and livestock 
holdings on the demand for formal insurance emerge, as both allow the implementation of self-insurance 
mechanisms and diversification. Nevertheless, this depends on the stratum of the population analyzed; for example, 
in the upper stratum, neither off-farm income nor livestock holdings have a significant effect.  
 
The effects of wealth on WTP may, in fact, be ambiguous. Patrick (1988), in a study on rainfall insurance 
for Australian wheat producers, finds higher rainfall insurance premiums associated with larger plots and with more 
conservative farmers and a higher level of net worth associated with lower premiums. Assets may provide a buffer 
against income shocks; however, a larger amount of assets may induce the farmer to take risky decisions and, 
therefore, to buy insurance. Akter et al. (2009), in their research on natural disaster risks in Bangladesh, find a 
positive influence of land holdings on insurance uptake. This outcome shows that land extension may not 
necessarily lead to better diversification and households that depend primarily on crop farming for their livelihood 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2014 Volume 30, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1674 The Clute Institute 
exhibit a greater demand for crop insurance. Ambiguous behavior related to wealth is shown by Clarke and Kalani 
(2011), who find the highest take-up ratio with intermediate wealth levels; in fact, farmers who are too poor may 
have nothing to lose and do not need to insure, while very rich farmers may have other options than insurance 
(Castellani et al., 2013).  
 
As for the case of wealth, cash holdings may also have contradictory roles. Cole et al. (2009), in their study 
on Andra Pradesh and Gujarat, show that the insurance demand is sensitive to cash on hand. They record an increase 
of 34.5% in participation by providing the household with cash, which is a much larger effect than cutting the price 
by 22–46%. However, cash obtained by other sources may negatively affect WTP. Indirectly linked to cash holdings 
is the existence of credit constraints; in Giné et al. (2008), credit constraints appear to be an impediment to the 
purchase of insurance, possibly because they limit the cash availability. On the other side, being indebted could 
negatively affect WTP if all the cash is used to repay the loan.   
 
The effect of aid is controversial. While aid offered (especially in cash) by the donors or the government 
may increase the farmers’ financial capacity to buy insurance, demand distortion may take place. In fact, as Sarris 
(2013) points out, in different studies, subsidies or initial endowments in experiments are the main element inducing 
farmers to buy insurance, given the quite frequent complaint of a lack of cash. This fact may have distortions on 
farmers’ decisions and in the interpretation of the results and may even compromise the possibility to implement real 
insurance schemes under market (not subsidized) conditions. Sakurai and Reardon (1997) find that public food aid, 
causing moral hazard, has a significant negative effect on the demand for drought insurance and discourages self-
insurance as well.  
 
Besides individual, household, or land characteristics, how insurance is offered may also make a difference, 
both in terms of accessibility and in terms of knowledge and trust on the part of the potential customer. Cole et al. 
(2009) register a positive influence on WTP for insurance of the association of the insurance product with 
individuals or symbols that the household trusts; in the Andhra Pradesh case, trusted local individuals endorsing the 
contract increase the probability of buying the contract by 40%. They notice that sale strategies, such as marketing 
visits, can help to build trust and knowledge about the product, in spite of the fact that other “subtle marketing 
treatments” have no statistically significant effect on insurance participation. This result is also confirmed by Hill 
and Robles (2011) in relation to visits from extension agents. Another important fact outlined is the role of social 
links, as potential customers are more likely to participate if they subscribe to the contract as a group. In the same 
sense, Hill et al. (2011) examine the changes in demand based on the offer of insurance to traditional risk-sharing 
groups in Ethiopia. They find that group insurance may make individuals decide to subscribe to a contract that they 
would not buy individually, especially those people who have more difficulty in understanding the contract terms. 
However, this is not the case when the trust level is generally low in the neighborhood. Patt et al. (2009) believe that 
trust could also be built through experiments conducted before the launch of a real product. 
 
In fact, knowledge and understanding of the contract terms are not granted among the potential recipients 
but may make the difference for their choices, as reported by Akter et al. (2009), who find that greater familiarity 
with insurance (related to education) makes purchases more likely. Giné et al. (2008) quote young people as an 
example of customers who deal more easily with such products, experiencing fewer cognitive costs of 
understanding. However, they do not find a significant effect of education on take-up, contrary to previous studies. 
Knowledge is probably favored by a higher level of education (Hill et al., 2011),  confirming why the young react 
positively to insurance. Cole (2009), on the contrary, finds that the provision of a small amount of additional 
financial education is not statistically significant in influencing WTP, as a consequence of possible sufficient 
existing education in the sample or, on the contrary, of inadequate education. Patrick (1988) explains a negative 
effect of education on take-ups with lower risk aversion.  
 
Knowledge may, in fact, be more or less adequate depending on the complexity of the contract, defined by 
its conditions: price, maturity, delivery methods, chosen index, triggers, or thresholds. Dalal and Morduch (2010) 
state that, based on behavioral patterns, sometimes just small adjustments to products or delivery methods or to other 
characteristics of the schemes enable the potential customer to understand the product better and be more willing to 
buy it. Among other things, they recommend taking the context into account, keeping the products simple, and 
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making sure that people appreciate the relevance of the contract; overall, they suggest that some of the marketing 
strategies applied to other fields should be applied to the offer of microinsurance.  
 
The contract conditions themselves directly affect WTP, and, quite often, their effect is combined. Cole et 
al. (2009), while estimating the price elasticity of the demand for rainfall insurance as between -0.66 and -0.88, state 
that what matters are the combination of the price and the suitability of the index chosen, or other contract 
conditions. In the introductory section, basis risk amplitude is quoted as one important factor (this is supported by 
Hill et al., 2011). This is empirically tested by Fuchs and Wolff (2011), in a study on weather index insurance in 
Mexico; they find basis risk to be one of the major problems in product design and outline the importance of setting 
suitable thresholds upon which to compute the triggers and compensations. In a pilot study in Ethiopia by Volpi 
(2005), farmers explicitly express the fear of a low correlation between the rainfall patterns at the weather station 
and those in the area where they have their plots; by being aware of multiple risk exposure they are not persuaded by 
single-risk protection if the price is not low enough.  
 
However, even suitable contracts may have some negative side effects, such as a disincentive to cultivate 
non-insured crops or to improve the technology systems such as irrigation (Fuchs & Wolff, 2011). In fact, while 
positive overall implications of the adoption of crop insurance on welfare are often deemed relevant in order to build 
a system of public incentives for the suppliers and the buyers, negative implications should be considered as well. 
Distortions in behaviors are probably more likely to happen if the contract is subsidized. Subsidization (a possibility 
foreseen by Hill et al., 2011) undoubtedly makes it more convenient to pay for insurance than to put in place 
alternative risk management methods. Conversely, from a market perspective, the insurance cost, reflecting the price 
of risk, must be set in such a way that makes the two alternatives comparable or at least not so different in economic 
terms. 
 
The ones quoted are just some of the possible patterns in exploring the dynamics of WTP for crop or 
drought insurance in a poor rural area. Some authors try to conceptualize the demand for insurance according to 
different analytical frameworks, namely considering insurance as a stand-alone hedging instrument, as a financial 
innovation, or as an input into a portfolio risk management strategy (Hill et al., 2011). Some of the cases of 
controversial effects mentioned above can indeed be explained by different frameworks and new findings may come 
from further analyses. Our study aims to shed some further light on the topic, considering the Ethiopian case. Before 
presenting the detail of the empirical research, some previous studies conducted in Ethiopia are analyzed.  
 
3. WEATHER AND CROP INSURANCE IN ETHIOPIA 
 
Ethiopia is of special interest in relation to the introduction of index insurance, being exposed to several 
hazards: besides droughts or heavy rains, pests or animal diseases often threaten production.  
 
Hill and Viceisza (2010) asked a sample of 261 Ethiopian households of Silte Woreda (Southern Ethiopia), 
chosen within iddirs (local risk-sharing groups), to take part in a game and decide whether they were willing to 
purchase fertilizers. They then introduced a weather index insurance contract coupled with a grant to purchase it. 
The experiment was organized in 12 sessions over a week: 6 without and 6 with insurance. The estimated positive 
changes in fertilizer purchases depending on insurance mean that the latter influences the decision to take more 
profitable risks (with effects on technology adoption). Since purchases may also depend on other factors, such as 
past weather conditions (in turn, affecting wealth and the perception of usefulness of fertilizers), and on socio-
economic factors (liquidity constraints, peer effects, and trust, as well understanding the products), a nearest-
neighbor matching estimation was conducted to control for some of these factors. Findings are a positive effect on 
the purchase of fertilizers of insurance and understanding of the contract, risk aversion, and acquired experience 
with fertilizers.  
 
Clark and Kalani (2011) conducted an experiment on WTP for index insurance and for indemnity 
insurance, to analyze whether these choices are rational, how to explain behaviors according to a utility theory, and 
whether insurance is better sold to risk-sharing groups. They used data on a sample of 378 households from the 
Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS)
ii
. Farmers were instructed, through visual aids, to make 3 decisions each 
time but were paid for only 1 of them and compensation was set in order to obtain an average expected daily earning 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2014 Volume 30, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1676 The Clute Institute 
higher than the daily wage. The cases of individual insurance, group insurance, and index insurance represented 
different sessions. The initial endowment was 65 ETB (Ethiopian Birr), with a potential loss of 50. Having included 
several explanatory variables, Clark and Kalani (2011) show a non-linear relationship between wealth (proxied by 
livestock ownership) and take-up of index insurance, with the highest frequency in the intermediate wealth levels. 
Contrary to other studies, education and knowledge do not increase the take-up of indemnity or index-based 
insurance. Historical risk exposure positively influences the take-up of indemnity insurance. Participation in risk-
sharing groups has the same effects on both types of insurance. A dummy representing the ability to obtain 
emergency cash of 100 ETB is positively associated with the take-up of index insurance, probably because it is a 
proxy for the higher degree of familiarity with informal risk-sharing methods and insurance. In general, they find a 
high take-up rate for index insurance, with higher than optimal coverage levels, and no evidence of lower than 
rational levels. Their point is that the behavioral explanations offered for the low take-up rate of other studies could 
be weak and if farmers buy few contracts it is just a rational decision due to the type of product offered and could be 
even lower.  
 
In Hill and Robles (2011), the basic idea is that farmers are diversified in their production and preferences 
and need to be offered diversified insurance contracts. They in fact maintain that offering each farmer a combination 
of weather derivatives is better than offering an index insurance, which is somehow standardized because it is often 
based on “a weighted combination of indexes with predetermined triggers designed to be a good hedge for an 
average farmer of a specific crop in a certain locale” (p. 1). Lack of customization and flexibility may hamper the 
adaptability of products to farmers. Farmers are different; in order to diversify among members of the same risk-
sharing group, they may even make different production decisions from their neighbors. The study is based both on 
a real-time experimental game and on a subsequent real purchase. The work was conducted in Silte Woreda; 406 
households were surveyed in the experimental game, in 2009, and 480 households in the insurance pilot offer, in 
2010. The offer included 6 securities (2 for each of the 3 main months of the rainy season), with a severe and 
moderate loss cut-off based on the records of a local weather station. The rainfall pattern foresaw 2 securities out of 
6 to pay. Each security had a fixed payout of 100 ETB and an expected value based on historical data. Endowments 
of between 30 and 60 ETB per person were randomly assigned to farmers, who were free to use or keep them. The 
costs transferred to the farmer in the case of a combination of weather derivatives were also considered as a trade-off 
element against greater flexibility. The farmers were checked with a follow-up survey. The take-up rates were 
extremely high (almost the entirety), thanks to the endowment as well. In 2010, a similar product was offered by a 
local insurance company, although for larger amounts of pay-offs (500 ETB) and the farmers had to pay with their 
own money. The take-up was lower for the participants in the experimental game, despite the payment received. 
Even accounting for the technical differences in the contracts, the authors question the validity of the experiments. 
They outline that the leaders of iddirs bought on behalf of their members in the experiments; these choices are 
considered as one take-up even if they benefit several farmers. To some extent, iddirs operate a sort of 
standardization, which is actually meant to be avoided. Concerning the analysis of farmers’ choices, the variations 
depend on several factors, among which are the type of crop, the soil quality, and the presence of extension services. 
The study is not really conclusive, as the authors admit, but allows them to answer the research questions. 
 
The study by Hill et al. (2011)
iii
 is based on a study of 1,400 Ethiopian households tracked for 15 years as 
part of the ERSH. The 2009 round includes a module on willingness to pay for weather insurance, so the analysis 
focuses on the demand for weather insurance based on the products’ and farmers’ characteristics. Insurance 
contracts are more likely to be bought by educated potential customers, who are wealthy and proactive, or by people 
with higher risk exposure or greater risk aversion. Distribution through local risk-sharing groups is preferred in order 
to optimize the risk management by combining informal risk sharing and insurance depending on the levels and 
types of risk (the studyrecalls Clarke & Dercon, 2009; Dercon et al., 2010). The basis risk was detailed and control 
questions were asked to make sure that the respondents understood the weather station measurements and 
compensation; the lack of trust or of understanding were minimized. The scheme foresaw a payment of 1,500 ETB 
when the rainfall falls below a given threshold; the premium suggested ranges between 10 and 40 ETB. More than 
80% of the respondents expressed the will to buy insurance, with individual and group distribution methods 
accounting for about 50% each. Refusals to buy are linked to the fear of not being able to pay or the lack of need. 
Although basis risk was present and negatively perceived by an estimated 30% of farmers for purchases beyond the 
first year, most farmers stated to be willing to buy in future years, despite not receiving compensation during the 
first one. The estimates of risk aversion, time preference, and the possibility to count on neighbors or the community 
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for help in the case of shocks as well as sources of finance for emergency (credit, sale of assets, participation in 
emergency insurance groups, such as the iddir, or remittances) were considered. Detailed questions were asked on 
the shock exposures and the rain expectations to compute the probability of occurrence. Individuals’ exposure to risk 
was estimated on consumption levels. The authors developed a basic model of insurance demand including price, 
risk aversion, basis risk, and wealth as variables. WTP is found to be negatively affected by price and positively 
affected by risk aversion (this outcome is somehow controversial). Another finding is that consumption levels are 
good predictors of the demand for insurance. Basis risk is proxied by self reported rainfall shocks and distance from 
weather stations; but only distance shows a significant and negative effect on demand. Besides, higher risk exposure 
increases WTP. While admitting the ambiguity of wealth effects, the conceptual model shows that WTP increases 
with wealth. The model was then extended by including other variables that could explain the purchase of insurance 
(age, sex, schooling, self-efficacy – confidence in one’s capability to change one’s life, time preference, household 
size, and access to financial institutions). A negative effect on WTP is caused by the attributes of being old, less 
educated, and female; the opposite occurs for access to financial services. Self-efficacy increases WTP, which is 
probably related to being prone to innovate. The results related to the preference for purchasing through iddirs – and 
their link to the trust issue – were reported in the preceding section.  
 
Norton et al. (2012)
iv
 implemented some experimental games in Tigray in 2010, within the Horn of Africa 
Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) project
v
. The aim was to compare different choices among the options for 
allocating an initial endowment of 70 ETB: taking the drought index insurance, investing in simulated savings 
accounts, participating in risk-sharing groups, or holding cash. The second and third options were offered with a 
bonus of 10%. Insurance was proposed in an identical format to the existing products with 2 frequencies of payouts 
(in 3 or 5 years) based on the observed rainfall. For an allocation of 5 ETB, 10 ETB (high frequency) or 15 ETB 
(low frequency) are paid in the worst years. One-third of the payment is ideally allocated to loadings even though 
for simplicity a 50% loading is used. The high-frequency insurance may be considered more aggressive, given the 
greater contributions required for the same payout in one year in both cases. Practice rounds were organized with 
representation of rainfall probabilities by drawing balls from a box. The decisions on allocation were then observed. 
The relation between customers’ characteristics and WTP was also analyzed. A preference for higher frequencies of 
payouts is recorded. This may derive from a preference for liquidity but also from insufficient self-insuring 
mechanisms, which would probably be more cost-effective. The more frequent choice of insurance over savings and 
over participation in risk-sharing groups is another outcome; in 50% of the villages, insurance is also preferred to 
cash holdings, possibly due to insufficient remuneration of savings. These results confute the common belief that 
poor farmers would minimize their expenses and the related insurance coverage. Therefore, in opposition to other 
studies, the authors maintain that there might be a lack of a suitable offer and of education rather than a lack of 
demand.  
 
The study by McIntosh et al. (2013) focuses on the use of fertilizers and their relationship with weather 
index insurance. The study was conducted in 2011 over two years of observations in the Amhara region. Many 
factors, including credit and insurance availability, are considered. Concentrating on the WTP for insurance, two 
different research approaches are offered: a survey estimating WTP and the observation of actual purchases. In the 
estimation, the insurance product was built upon data from the nearby weather station; the prices varied from 50 to 
250 ETB. Three options were offered: stand-alone insurance, fertilizers financed with credit, and insurance and 
fertilizers financed with credit. The outcomes show that being the household head, having greater farmland, or 
having incurred greater effects of weather shocks in the past positively influence WTP, while the opposite result is 
registered for credit constraints and the use of coping mechanisms. The price (estimated in 277 ETB) was very close 
to the actuarial calculation. A real offer was made through the Nyala Insurance Company (NISCO) 18 months later. 
Vouchers were provided, implying a subsidy of up to 70% of the premiums. The take-up rates were low and the 
WTP was strongly affected by the presence of vouchers and only lightly influenced by a few other variables, such as 
the precedent use of fertilizer. The behavioral variables or basis risk (probably not well perceived) were not relevant. 
Although they are not fully comparable, the two approaches show slightly positive or even negative effects. 
Common with other research is the lack of cash as an obstacle to take-up, which, in fact, is mainly driven by cash 
vouchers (although not very high – 50%). McIntosh et al. (2013) conclude that the product design and fine-tuning is 
challenging, and the issue of subsidies deserves attention and caution. 
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Besides pilot projects, in Ethiopia, the implementations are increasing. Among them is the Ethiopian 
Project on Interlinking Insurance with Credit in Agriculture (EPIICA) offered by NISCO and Dashen Bank in the 
Amhara region (McIntosh et al., 2013). Nahu (2011) describes NISCO involvement and other initiatives in Ethiopia, 
including a weather derivative through which the World Food Programme made the Government of Ethiopia buy 
coverage by AXA Re in 2006 in order to obtain eventual financial resources for food aid in the case of extended 
drought. Even if not triggered, proved to be a new strategy for handling the consequences of weather shocks at the 
governmental level.   
 
Two other products offered by NISCO are the piloting Double Trigger Multiple Peril Crop Insurance 
(DTMPCI) and the Weather Index Crop Insurance (WICI). The first is an area yield insurance, in which crop loss is 
measured against different types of risk, among which are rainfall and fire. The first pilot project, in 2007, 
concerned 120 farmers in Oromia region (Rift Valley area), through a farmer cooperative for teff, wheat, and haricot 
beans. The product was then extended to other areas and other crops (chickpeas and lentils). The total customers 
served were 827 of 47,000 potential customers. The second product, offered in 2009, was a simpler WICI, based on 
weather station data, for smallholder farmers in the Tigray (promoted, as mentioned, by OXFAM) and Oromia (with 
the World Food Programme) regions. In the two areas, 337 farmers were first served in total, and then increased to 
1,368 in 2010 with the extension to the South (SNNP region
vi
),  in Amhara region and other areas of the Oromia 
region. A new pilot project was later promoted for livestock indemnity insurance by the NISCO in collaboration 
with the Association of Ethiopian Micro-Financial Institutions (AEMFI). Overall, Nahu (2011) lists the weaknesses 
and strengths of these pilots. Among the first are the lack of awareness by farmers of a suitable regulatory 
framework and, very importantly, a lack of reliable data. The delivery channels are considered limited, as are 
insurance companies. Among the positive issues are the increasing attention of the Government to small farmers and 
the expected establishment of a reinsurance intermediary in Ethiopia. The author concludes by stressing the need to 
consider other risks faced by farmers. This point is also made by Volpi (2005), with respect to a project of the World 
Bank in cooperation with the Ethiopian Insurance Corporation (EIC), also quoted by Nahu (2011). Volpi (2005) 
suggests the reasons why farmers were not so reactive to the proposed insurance contract. After the instruction 
phase, only 26 farmers in Alaba (a village in SNNP region) bought the contract and more than 50% did not repeat 
the purchase. Volpi (2005) stresses the rationality of farmers, who stated that the contract only addressed one 
important risk, but several other equally important risks affect their vulnerability.  
 
4. EXPERIMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE SURVEY 
 
Based on a sample of 120 rural households in the Wolayta zone in Southern Ethiopia (SNNP region), we 
aim to estimate the willingness to pay  for a rainfall weather derivative. The survey was administered by a team of 
10 trained enumerators over a period of 3 weeks, in March 2013. The farmers were randomly selected from a larger 
sample of 360 farmers already involved in a three-year data collection project (2010–2013).vii The surveyed farmers 
were from three Kebele.
viii
: Hembecchio, Kutto Sorfella, and Abala Faracho . The villages are representative of 3 
different agro-ecological zones of the Wolayta area which differ in terms of altitude, rainfall pattern, and 
households’ livelihood strategies. The zones are named by the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture after their 
characteristic crops: the ginger and coffee zone, barley and wheat zone, and maize and root crop zone.  
 
According to the existing literature, preliminary empirical studies on the willingness to pay for crop 
insurance employ a latent demand approach based on the stated production decisions and risk management strategies 
of farmers (Fraser, 1992; Gautam et al., 1994; Sakurai & Reardon, 1997). More recent studies are based on either 
stated preferences or revealed preferences. In the first case, the preferences are elicited through survey-based 
techniques, such as contingent valuation methods or conjoint methods (Akter et al., 2009; Heenkenda, 2011; 
McCarthy, 2003; Patrick, 1988; Sarris et al., 2006; Sherrick et al., 2003). In the other case, data are collected 
through experimental games, randomized control trials or pilot projects (Clarke & Kalani, 2011; De Janvry & 
Sadoulet, 2013; Dercon et al., 2014; Galarza & Carter, 2008; Giné et al., 2008; Hill & Robles, 2011; Hill et al., 
2011; Norton et al., 2011; Shawn et al., 2013).  
 
This study is based on an experiment. The pros and cons of experiments are highlighted by both the 
adopters and users of alternative methods. Their efficacy is challenged by those studies in which the outcomes of 
experiments and of real life related to WTP show little correlation, as in the case of Hill and Robles (2011) or 
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McIntosh et al. (2013). Norton et al. (2011, 2012) find the opposite. Despite these caveats, Hill and Veceisza (2010) 
state that small-scale field experiments are interesting as they may be conducted in an environment in which 
disturbing effects, such as credit constraints or trust issues, are absent. More importantly, Patt et al. (2009) highlight 
the learning process triggered by experimental games, which may increase financial literacy and trust. However, 
distorted behaviors in experiments based on an initial cash endowment must be recalled. 
 
In this study, we use data from a discrete choice experiment in which the interviewees were asked to make 
a choice out of different choice sets. Discrete choice methods are based on random utility models and allow for 
heterogeneity in consumers’ decisions (Hensher et al., 2005). Unlike traditional stated preference methods, they test 
for different combinations of price and other attributes and hence provide a better estimate of the demand curve. The 
theoretical model and the empirical methodology are discussed in detail in the next section.  
 
The study takes a full client’s perspective instead of a supply perspective. The objective is to gain a 
preliminary understanding of the potential clients and estimate the willingness to pay for drought insurance. Neither 
traditional crop insurance nor other kinds of formal insurance were available at the time when the survey was 
conducted; informal insurance was widespread. In a separate questionnaire designed for the larger sample, we asked 
households to provide a definition of insurance and the answers hint that there is very limited knowledge about 
insurance in general. Besides, in our sample, the percentage of illiterate people was high (34%). For these reasons, 
we decided to keep the field experiment as simple as possible. We opted for a weather derivative with a very limited 
number of attributes, instead of a more complex index-based insurance. Besides, as stated in the previous sections, 
weather derivatives are more flexible than standard index insurance (Hill & Robles, 2011). 
 
The hypothetical product offered to the households was not designed according to the real rainfall data and 
tuned on the basis of households’ feedback, but adjusted to a product that was already available in another area of 
the same region and had proved to be somewhat successful (Hill & Robles, 2011). The product pays a fixed 
indemnity when either a moderate or a severe shortage of rainfall occurs. The pilot project implemented by Hill and 
Robles (2011) was employed as a benchmark in order to build reasonable hypothetical products that households can 
actually afford. An actuarially fair price is thus unobserved by the researcher, but we can expect that it lies in one or 
more of the different premium compensation combinations that we considered in the discrete choice experiment. 
Unlike the project in Hill and Robles (2011) where customers could buy more than one security and for different 
agricultural months, we allowed the households to buy just one contract that covers each of the two agricultural 
seasons.  
 
Preliminary focus group interviews in the villages were carried out in order to understand households’ 
perception of drought risk and to outline a shared definition of moderate drought and severe drought. In the second 
phase, we performed an experiment in which households were faced with eight different choice situations and an 
extra choice with a strictly dominant alternative to allow for potential inconsistency. In each choice situation, the 
respondent could opt for one of two different insurance products or the status quo alternative. The experiment 
complies with orthogonality in the product’s attributes (Hensher et al., 2005).        
 
The five categories of the product attributes are: covered season, intensity of drought, supplier, premium, 
and compensation. In particular, the season category has two levels: Belg, i.e. the small rainy season between the 
beginning of March and the end of May, and Meher, i.e. the big rainy season between the beginning of June and the 
end of September. The insurance supplier category comprises: microfinance institution (MFI), farmers’ cooperative, 
informal insurance association (Iddir to use the local name
ix
), and Kebele.  
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Figure 1: Example Of The Choice Set 
 
 During the interviews, we asked the households to state their perceived frequency of occurrence of both 
moderate and severe drought according to the definition provided. We consider the perceived frequency as an extra 
attribute of the product assuming that the greater the perceived frequency with respect to the frequency implied in 




 In this section, we present the theoretical approach which describes the household’s optimizing behavior 
regarding the choice among different insurance alternatives. A household n faces a choice among J alternatives in 
each of T choice situations. We suppose that the utility that the household obtains from choosing alternative j is a 




       
                (1) 
 
whereas the attributes are observed by the analyst, the coefficient vector    is unobserved for each n and varies 
across households with density        , where   are the parameters of this distribution that are to be estimated. The 
stochastic element,     , is also unobserved and different assumptions on its distribution result in different choice 
models. As is usually common in choice analysis, we impose the condition that      is independent and identically 
distributed (IID) extreme value type 1 (or Gumbel) across all n, j, and t (Hensher, Rose, & Greene, 2005). 
Conditional on   , the logit probability of household n choosing alternative j in the choice situation t is: 
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 The standard logit model, as expressed by (2), does not allow for unobserved characteristics that can induce 
correlation among the alternatives in a choice situation and among the choices over time. The mixed multinomial 
logit model, i.e. the unconditional logit probability, overcomes these restrictions by allowing for the variance in the 
unobserved household-specific parameters and, therefore, does not exhibit the property of independence from 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (Revelt & Train, 1998). The mixed logit probability is: 
 
    
      
 
  
     
    
      
                     (3) 
 
Equation (3) is a weighted average of the logit formula evaluated for different values of   . It follows that the mixed 
logit probability for the sequence of choices is: 
 
    
       
 
  
     
    
      
                        (4) 
 
In (4), we want to estimate  , that is, the population parameters that describe the distribution of individual 
parameters (Revelt & Train, 1998).  
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6. HOUSEHOLDS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
 
In the empirical analysis, we include several variables that proxy for households’ characteristics in order to 
allow for further potential heterogeneity in the attributes’ coefficient. The data are taken from the larger survey that 
includes the sample used in this study
xi
. An important household characteristic should be net income. It is, along 
with the price, the usual component of demand models. However, we are unable to estimate the net income properly 
as the current data available do not allow for a proper costing.
xii
 For that reason, the net income is not included in the 
analysis.   
 
As an alternative proxy for the household’s economic capacity we use the household’s net worth, that is, 
the difference between the total assets and the total financial liabilities. The total assets include agricultural assets, 
non-agricultural assets, and financial assets.
xiii
 The financial liabilities are made up of all the outstanding debts. The 
net worth is also a proxy for the ability of the household to cope with negative shocks and make up for unexpected 
expenses. However, we do not control for the different liquidity costs of assets. Instead of considering the absolute 
value of net worth, we test for a non-linear relationship with the insurance take-up probability by taking net worth 
percentiles. 
 
The land holdings are not considered in the assets since in Ethiopia they are not a household’s property.xiv 
Farmers commonly establish informal crop-sharing or short-term rent agreements. The size of land is, however, 
important in the decision regarding which crop to grow and to what extent. When the land does not provide a living, 





Age, gender, and the number of family members may proxy for the interviewee’s risk aversion. Education 
can influence the ability to understand the insurance product and appreciate the insurance’s utility properly. We 
consider whether the interviewee is literate and the school grade reached.   
 
Trust and transaction costs may influence financial decisions and be affected by the fact of being a client of 
a microfinance institution, a member of a local cooperative, or part of one or more Iddirs; therefore, these factors 
can increase the likelihood of preferring one supplier to another and we test for these effects. Finally, we include 
some dummy variables to control for the basis risk. In our case, the basis risk is the probability of receiving 
compensation when the households are not affected by drought or not receiving compensation when they are 
affected. The dummy variables are built on stated perceptions of how different the rainfall pattern is in the 
household’s field from the location of the weather station and how much more or much less it rains at the weather 
station than in the household’s field.    
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Table 1: Variables 
Variable name Definition Unit Type 
Product’s attributes 
   
Premium Cost of the insurance contract ETB Integer 
Indemnity Expected payment in the case of drought ETB Integer 
Belg If Belg is the covered season 0,1 Dummy 
Perceived frequency How often a moderate or severe drought occurs Years Integer 
Cooperative If a cooperative is the supplier 0,1 Dummy 
MFI If the MFI is the supplier 0,1 Dummy 
Iddir If the Iddir is the supplier 0,1 Dummy 
Household’s and interviewee’s characteristics 
  
Net worth lower than second centile Net worth <= ETB 4,055  0,1 Dummy 
Net worth between second and fourth centile ETB 4, 055 < Net worth <= ETB 6,902 0,1 Dummy 
Net worth between fourth and sixth centile ETB 6,902 < Net worth <= ETB 11,155 0,1 Dummy 
Net worth between sixth and eighth centile ETB 11,155 < Net worth <= ETB 14,780 0,1 Dummy 
Net worth greater than eighth centile Net worth > ETB 14,780  0,1 Dummy 
Log of landholdings Household’s landholdings Log(Timad) Continuos 
Age Interviewee’s age Years 
 
Gender If the interviewee is male 0,1 Dummy 
Number of fam. members Number of members who live with the head N. Integer 
Illiterate If the interviewee is illiterate 0,1 Dummy 
Education Grade reached at school N. Integer 
Cooperative client If client of at least one cooperative 0,1 Dummy 
MFI client If client of at least one MFI 0,1 Dummy 
Iddir member Number of Iddirs of which the HH is a member N. Integer 
Very different pattern and less rain  
Very different rainfall pattern and less rain on 
average 
0,1 Dummy 
Somewhat different pattern and less rain 
Somewhat different rainfall pattern and less 
rain on average 
0,1 Dummy 
Somewhat different pattern and more rain 
Very different rainfall pattern and less rain on 
average 
0,1 Dummy 
Very different pattern and more rain  




7. ESTIMATES OF MARGINAL EFFECTS AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
 
A preliminary analysis was carried out considering all the variables listed in Table 1 and their interactions. 
However, in the final model, we retained only those variables and interactions that turned out to be statistically 
significant and sufficiently consistent over different model specifications. Table 2 presents the estimation results of 
the conditional logit (CL) model and the mixed logit (ML) model. The estimate coefficients of the ML are almost all 
significant and the overall goodness of fit is somewhat higher than in the CL. Besides, the standard deviations of the 
two random coefficients are statistically very significant and important in size. This suggests that the ML is more 
appropriate.  
 
The premium coefficient is negative, as expected, and the marginal effect implies that, for instance, an 
increase of ETB 100 in the insurance price decreases the likelihood of purchasing it by 28%. The price marginal 
effect accounts for the opposite behavior: a positive coefficient, of high net worth households that, given the average 
experiment premium, are more willing to purchase insurance by 13%, on average. Unexpectedly, the compensation 
coefficient is also negative and reflects unobservable motivations. Given that premium and compensation are almost 
uncorrelated
xvi
, one reasonable explanation is that the greater the compensation, the lower the trust that the 
compensation will actually be paid. This outcome deserves some further investigation but may be interpreted as a 
symptom of farmers’ rationality, as explained below.   
 
Despite the majority of households considering Meher to be the most important agricultural season, the 
results hint that they prefer to insure against a possible drought in the Belg season. The likelihood of choosing 
insurance that covers the Belg season is greater, on average, by about 6%. There are, however, some differences 
among households in terms of the preferred season. Households with a net worth between the second and the fourth 
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centile along with households that believe that their rainfall pattern is somewhat different from that at the weather 
station and that it rains more on average tend to prefer Meher. The results for the second and fourth centiles may 
also be linked to farmers’ rationality, according to the controversial effect of wealth on WTP reported in section 2. 
On the other hand, households that believe that the rainfall pattern on their field is very different from that at the 
weather station and that it rains less on average tend to prefer Belg. These results suggest that the Belg season is 
considered more exposed to drought risk.      
 
Table 2: Estimation By Conditional Logit And Mixed Logit 
  Conditional Logit Mixed Logit 
Variable Estimate Std Err. Estimate Std Err. Marg. Eff. 
Premium -0.0242*** 0.0027 -0.0229*** 0.0032 -0.0028 
Premium * Net worth greater than eighth centile  0.0108** 0.0043 0.0126*** 0.0049 0.1273 
Indemnity -0.0183*** 0.0019 -0.0089*** 0.0033 -0.0012 
Belg season 0.4257* 0.2522 0.8322*** 0.3015 0.0578 
Belg season * Net worth between second and fourth 
centile  
-0.9615** 0.4254 -1.4150*** 0.5159 -0.1056 
Belg season * Very different pattern and less rain  0.6398 0.4044 0.7637* 0.4338 0.0570 
Belg season * Somewhat different pattern and more 
rain 
-0.9973*** 0.2834 -1.1430*** 0.3123 -0.0853 
Perceived frequency 0.0120 0.0176 -0.3092*** 0.0916 -0.0427 




Cooperative -0.8737*** 0.2501 -0.8162** 0.3206 -0.0337 




Cooperative * Illiterate 0.7645** 0.3299 0.9399** 0.4117 0.0367 
Cooperative * MFI client 1.1080*** 0.3299 1.3776*** 0.4413 0.0538 
MFI -0.1021 0.3615 0.5569 0.4645 Not sig. 
MFI * Net worth between second and fourth centile  -1.8004*** 0.5081 -2.6278*** 0.6825 -0.0916 
MFI * Illiterate 1.2242*** 0.3698 1.6568*** 0.4592 0.0577 
Iddir -0.3271 0.2875 0.1556 0.3675 Not sig. 
Iddir * Net worth between second and fourth centile  -1.585*** 0.5181 -2.2017*** 0.6311 -0.0758 
Iddir * Illiterate 0.6566* 0.3365 0.7934** 0.3863 0.0273 








Pseudo-R2 0.325   0.371     
*** Significance level at 1% 
     
** Significance level at 5% 
     
* Significance level at 10% 
     
 
The  lower the perceived frequency (i.e. longer time lag between two occurrences) of drought the lower the 
likelihood of purchasing insurance; there is a preference for insurance against moderate drought since it recurs more 
frequently and may be forecast with less uncertainty than a severe drought. This also confirms the farmers’ 
awareness and rationality. Furthermore, poor rural households are probably impatient and discount long-term 
realizations more than the better-off. For instance, an increase of 3 years in the perceived frequency of drought (i.e. 
the time intervals between droughts increase) decreases the likelihood of purchasing insurance by nearly 13% on 
average. The standard deviation of the perceived frequency is also statistically significant but small, and implies that 
for 12% of the surveyed households the coefficient is positive instead.   
 
With regard to the preferred insurance supplier, the results are somewhat uncertain with the only 
statistically significant coefficient for the cooperative case. If the insurance products were distributed by the 
cooperative instead of the Kebele administration, the willingness to purchase would decrease by 3% on average. The 
standard deviation is also very statistically significant and of high economic relevance. For 39% of the surveyed 
households, the coefficient is indeed positive. The cooperative is mostly preferred by illiterate interviewees and MFI 
clients. The coefficients for the MFI and Iddir variables are both positive but not statistically significant. However, 
again, illiterate interviewees prefer both the MFI and the Iddir to the Kebele. The opposite occurs for households 
with a net worth between the second and the fourth centiles. An interpretation of this different behavior is offered 
below. 
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Table 3 presents the average estimates of the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for the insurance 
attributes, computed as the negative ratio of the attribute’s coefficient and premium’s coefficient. The interaction 
variables are considered at the mean value. Both standard errors and confidence intervals are constructed with the 
Krinsky–Robb method, as in Hensher and Greene (2003). First, households would pay a lower premium by ETB 
0.46 for every ETB 1 increase in compensation. Second, households would pay about ETB 11 extra for an insurance 
product that covers the Belg compared with the Meher season; however, the MWTP is not statistically significant. 
Third, for every one more year in the perceived drought frequency, households would pay a lower premium by 
nearly ETB 15 on average. Besides, the empirical distribution of the MWTP for the perceived frequency (Figure 2) 
suggests that it is negative for 87% of the sample. The remaining 13% of the sample would pay more for an 
insurance product against a longer-term drought, such as a severe drought. Fourth, households would pay about ETB 
12 less on average if the supplier was a local cooperative instead of the Kebele, but this result is not statistically 
significant. However, according to the empirical distribution, around 40% of the surveyed households show a 
positive MWTP and would pay a higher premium if the supplier was the cooperative. Assuming a 15% loading on a 
fair premium of ETB 100, the share of the sampled population that would prefer the cooperative to the Kebele would 
shrink to about 29%. This result is a consequence of a premium increase. On the one hand, a member of the 
cooperative can also benefit from the cooperative profits, and should be more willing to participate in covering 
expenses. However, on the other hand, members’ expectation of cost-effectiveness of the cooperative implies that 
paying a higher premium to cover overestimated administrative costs is considered irrational. Finally, the MWTP of 
MFI and Iddir attributes are not statistically significant, suggesting that the households are indifferent between these 
potential suppliers and the Kebele. 
 
The preferences among providers are not straightforward to explain. The still limited knowledge of the MFI 
by the poorest may induce them to show an undefined preference based more on expectations than on awareness. 
The poorest may instead prefer the Iddir as poor people, having a smaller amount of assets under risk (Castellani et 
al., 2013), are its main target. For the total sample, on the contrary, the indifference between Iddir and Kebele in 
providing insurance may be the outcome of the preference for market solutions over administrative ones and of the 
awareness of the current limited ability of Iddirs to provide drought insurance to wealthier farmers. The case of the 
cooperative is more intriguing as it shows opposite signs. Cooperatives are increasingly spreading in rural areas of 
Ethiopia. Some of them prove to be effective while others show weak management and ability to provide services to 
members. The outcomes in the sample probably vary depending on the experience of the individual farmers.   
 
Table 3: Estimates Of The Mean, Standard Error, And Confidence Interval Of Willingness To Pay 
      95% confidence interval 
Attribute Mean Std Err. LB UB 
Indemnity -0.457 0.210 -0.940 -0.105 
Belg season 11.162 12.906 -14.232 36.443 
Perceived frequency -15.403 4.721 -25.309 -6.612 
(Std dev. perceived probability) 13.231 3.581 6.889 20.976 
(Supplier:) 
    Cooperative -12.584 14.410 -44.546 12.571 
(Std dev. cooperative) 43.058 17.141 12.398 80.003 
MFI 28.133 20.561 -16.293 66.076 
Iddir -1.813 17.179 -38.340 28.653 
Note: The mean and std error were estimated through simulation as in Hensher and Greene (2003) employing 10,000 random 




The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2014 Volume 30, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1685 The Clute Institute 
 
Note: The empirical distribution was simulated following the methodology 
of Hensher and Greene (2003) employing 5 ml random standard normal draws. 
Figure 2: Empirical Distribution Of The Marginal Willingness To Pay For Perceived Frequency Of Drought And Cooperative 
 
8. STANDARDIZED VS. CUSTOM-MADE INSURANCE PRODUCTS 
 
Figures 3 and 4 report the distributions of the perceived frequency of moderate and severe drought. The 
stated frequency of occurrence of a moderate drought is very similar in the 3 villages, with an overall mean of 2.42 
years and a standard deviation of 1.03 years. Besides, in two villages the shape of the distributions is also similar. 
The frequency of severe drought shows some differences which are almost trivial in relative terms. For the severe 
drought case, the overall mean is 15.39 years and the standard deviation is 7.57 years. The differences are more 
remarkable looking at the shape of the distributions with a median value between 10 and 20 years.        
 
This preliminary analysis of the perceived frequency supports the design of a sole insurance product against 
the risk of moderate drought and, with appropriate caution, of severe drought. The design of a suitable product, 
however, must rely on  the comparison between the perceived frequency and the actual rainfall distribution.   
 
We here employ the ML model estimates of Table 2 to assess the attractiveness of hypothetical drought 
insurance products. We compare an ad-hoc product tailored to the household’s perceived drought frequency and 
different products designed according to a reference frequency. This exercise allows us to estimate the likelihood of 
purchasing a standardized product (S) against a custom-made product (CM). We take different values as the 
reference frequency of drought that corresponds, in Figure 3 and Figure 4, to the “All” distribution’s mean, mean 
plus one standard deviation, mean minus one standard deviation, mode, and median. 
 
For every reference frequency K and compensation amount Y, we work out the equivalent fair premium 
(see Table 4) and the market share (ΔMS) of CM as the difference in terms of the predicted aggregate likelihood of 
purchase. The latter is calculated as follows: 
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                    (5) 
 
where X are the household characteristics that interact with K and Y. Since the other product’s attributes are the same 
for both products, they are irrelevant to the decision process.  
 
 We find that, as the reference frequency is decreased (i.e. longer time lags), the premium shrinks and the 
market share of the standardized product grows. Second, when the reference frequency is greater (i.e. shorter time 
lags) than the average perceived frequency, as the compensation increases, the market share of the standardized 
product falls. On the contrary, when the reference frequency is smaller than the average perceived frequency, the 
market share of the standardized product increases along with the compensation.  Finally, as the average perceived 
frequency of drought decreases, such as in the severe drought case, the market share of the standardized product 
becomes less sensitive to changes in the reference frequency and the amount of indemnity. It follows that, in the 
design of an insurance product for moderate drought, a small change in the reference frequency and, then, in the fair 
premium can lead to a big change in the willingness to pay. On the contrary, in the design of an insurance product 
for severe drought, small changes in the reference frequency barely affect the willingness to pay.     
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Figure 4: Kernel Distribution Of Perceived Frequency Of Severe Drought (In Years) 
 
 
Table 4: Reference Frequencies, Indemnities, And Fair Premiums 
Ref. freq./Ind. 400 450 550 600 
Moderate:     
1.395 286.74 322.58 394.27 430.11 
2 200 225 275 300 
2.425 164.95 185.57 226.80 247.42 
3 133.33 150 183.33 200 
3.455 115.77 130.25 159.19 173.66 
Severe:     
7.80 51.28 57.69 70.51 76.92 
10 40 45 55 60 
13.5 29.63 33.33 40.74 44.44 
15.39 25.99 29.24 35.74 38.99 
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Figure 6. Market Share (Predicted Likelihood) 




Crop insurance against the risk of drought is still in a pilot phase in Ethiopia and most rural households are 
unaware of formal insurance. We carry out a stated choice experiment in three villages in Southern Ethiopia in order 
to assess the WTP for a weather derivative product that pays a fixed indemnity if a drought occurs.  
 
We find that the premium, compensation, and perceived drought frequency are important determinants of 
the insurance take-up. A market simulation analysis suggests that households are more sensitive to premium and 
compensation changes when the insurance product is against moderate but more frequent drought. Opposite to the 
case of premium and perceived frequency which show the expected coefficient sign, a negative coefficient is 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2014 Volume 30, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1689 The Clute Institute 
counterintuitive for the compensation. Further alternative hypotheses is necessary, but this outcome, coupled with 
some other observed behaviors, supports the hypothesis of farmers’ rational choices , following Clark and Kalani 
(2011) and Volpi (2005). In fact, the farmers’ reluctance to buy protection against larger losses may be the result of 
perceived unfairness in the premium/compensation ratio,  with a consequent low probability to be paid . Other 
rational choices pertain to the unique behavior of farmers belonging to the second to fourth centiles. This supports 
the findings of Clark and Kalani (2011) who show that WTP has a non-linear relationship with wealth and Castellani 
et al. (2013) who  suggest that very poor farmers may have nothing at stake in the case of drought, while very rich 
ones can diversify and need less insurance. The rational logic behind the controversial preference for cooperatives as 
providers was discussed in the previous section. Further proof of rationality is the overall preference for protection 
against moderate drought. This is in line with the characteristics of the product offered (a weather derivative) and 
with the awareness of farmers that forecasts are easier for events occurring more frequently. Lastly, the reticence of 
the poorest farmers to buy long-term insurance shows awareness of the implicit risk, which makes them discount 
long-term values at a higher interest rate.  
 
This study adds to the existing empirical literature and provides further insights into the factors that explain 
the WTP for drought insurance. However, since the experiment in the field relies on a simple hypothetical product, 
we recommend fine-tuning the analysis, allowing for different payment alternatives and more than one contract
xvii
 as 
in the second round of this experiment. Finally, this study suggests caution in designing products and points out the 
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END NOTES 
                                                 
i
 For more details about the advantages and disadvantages of these contracts, besides those quoted here and in the next 
section on Ethiopia, see Hess (2003), Skees (2003), and Larson et al. (2002). 
ii
  ERHS covered 15 villages and 1,600 households with 7 rounds between 1994 and 2009 in 3 Ethiopian regions. Data 
used on 378 households refer to the 2009 round and are concentrated on 7 ERHS sites. 
iii
 Subsequently published in 2013 in Agricultural Economics, 44, 385–398. 
iv
 The same study is presented in Norton et al. (2011).  
v
 HARITA is promoted by Oxfam America in partnership with Swiss Re and other partners; it subsequently became the 
R4 Rural Resiliency Initiative, supported by the World Food Programme and the Rockefeller Foundation.  
vi
 Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region.  
vii
 For more information on this project see http://www.unibg.it/struttura/struttura.asp?cerca=findev_microrimi. A short 
essay on the preliminary outcomes of this study was presented at the III CUCS Congress, Turin. See Castellani et al. 
(2014). 
viii
 The word Kebele is normally used with two meanings: the local administrative unit (here improperly defined as village) 
and the local Government authority at the unit level. In the following part, we refer to Kebele as the local Government 
administration. 
ix
 The hypothesis of using Iddirs as providers relies on the idea of selecting the stronger and more formalized ones. 
x
 Expression (1) is how the utility is usually represented in discrete choice models (Hensher, Rose, & Greene, 2005).  
xi
 See section 4. 
xii
 The estimation of net income is quite a challenge in rural areas, especially as far as expenses are concerned. One single 
survey is usually insufficient to obtain reliable information. The multiple-survey approach of the MicroRiMI research 
project can allow for this estimation. The data are undergoing processing. 
xiii
 The non-agricultural assets are: bicycles, motorcycles, radio sets, mobile phones, jewels and watches, tables and chairs, 
and beds. The financial assets are savings and outstanding credit.  
xiv
 In Ethiopia the land is owned by the Government.  
xv
 Four timad are approximately one hectare.  
xvi
 This is due to the way the experiment is designed. 
xvii
 The second experiment was designed according to these lessons learnt, and the data are still under analysis.   
